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REDUCING OVERFITTING IN CHALLENGE-BASED
COMPETITIONS
By Elias Chaibub Neto1,∗, Bruce R Hoff1, Chris Bare1, Brian M
Bot1, Thomas Yu1, Lara Magravite1, Andrew D Trister1, Thea
Norman1, Pablo Meyer2,⋆, Julio Saez-Rodrigues3,4,⋆, James C
Costello5,⋆, Justin Guinney1,⋆, Gustavo Stolovitzky6,⋆
Over-fitting is a dreaded foe in challenge-based competitions. Be-
cause participants rely on public leaderboards to evaluate and re-
fine their models, there is always the danger they might over-fit to
the holdout data supporting the leaderboard. The recently published
Ladder algorithm aims to address this problem by preventing the par-
ticipants from exploiting willingly or inadvertently minor fluctuations
in public leaderboard scores during model refinement. In this paper,
we report a vulnerability of the Ladder that induces severe over-
fitting of the leaderboard when the sample size is small. To circum-
vent this attack, we propose a variation of the Ladder that releases
a bootstrapped estimate of the public leaderboard score instead of
providing participants with a direct measure of performance. We also
extend the scope of the Ladder to arbitrary performance metrics by
relying on a more broadly applicable testing procedure based on the
Bayesian bootstrap. Our method makes it possible to use a leader-
board, with the technical and social advantages that it provides, even
in cases where data is scant.
Introduction. Challenge-based competitions[1, 2, 3] have became a
popular strategy for crowdsourcing and benchmarking solutions in com-
plex data science problems. In these competitions, the community is pre-
sented with a challenge, the data to address the challenge, and a mecha-
nism for independent and unbiased assessment of the submitted solutions.
In biomedical research, challenge-based competitions have been used to ad-
dress methodological bottlenecks in several areas including text mining[4],
gene network inference[5], prediction of drug synergy[6], and prediction of
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protein structure, function, and interactions[7, 8]. The Dialogue for Reverse
Engineering Assessments and Methods (DREAM) consortium, alone, has
organized over 35 challenges examining complex prediction problems in bi-
ology and medicine (http://dreamchallenges.org). More generally, challenge
organizing companies such as InnoCentive, have been crowdsourcing solu-
tions for problems in engineering, computer science, math, chemistry, life
sciences, physical sciences and business, while Kaggle specializes in predic-
tive modeling and analytics competitions tailored, in most part, to industry
problems, and Topcoder specializes in computer programming contests.
In predictive-modelling competitions, a participant is usually provided
with data and is required to predict an output variable. The challenge orga-
nizers usually split all the available data into training, public leaderboard,
and final scoring sets. Challenge participants have access to both input and
response data in the training set, but only to the input variables in the pub-
lic and final leaderboard sets. In the first phase of the challenge, participants
generate and submit predictions to the public leaderboard, then the chal-
lenge organizers score and rank the participants according to their predictive
performance. Multiple submissions per participant are usually allowed dur-
ing this phase. The ranks of the participants in the public leaderboard are,
nonetheless, not used in the determination of the challenge best perform-
ers. Rather, the purpose of public leaderboard is to provide the participants
the opportunity to evaluate and refine their own models and compare their
performance with others, prior to submitting their final predictions.
Because participants rely on sequential submissions to evaluate and refine
their models, there is always the danger they might over-fit their models to
the holdout response data supporting the public leaderboard. There may
also be malicious attempts to deliberately over-fit the public leaderboard in
order to discourage other participants from making a final submission, or to
reverse engineer the response data in the public leaderboard to increase the
amount of training data used to make the final submission. In either case,
many challenges are one-of-a kind datasets that cannot be easily reproduced,
such as challenges based on clinical trials or large cohorts of patients. In
these cases, it is important to get the methodological aspects of challenge
organization and rigor in scoring correctly, so that valuable datasets are
used in the most advantageous ways to advance the field. To address these
problems, participants are often limited in the number of submissions they
can make to the leaderboard and performance scores are rounded to a less
precise value. This practice is, nonetheless, far from ideal since it also re-
stricts the ability of the participants to refine their models and generate
better solutions to the problem the challenge is aiming to solve. In order to
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relax this constraint, Hardt and Blum[9] recently proposed the Ladder algo-
rithm (Algorithm 1 in Methods), which reduces over-fitting by preventing
participants from exploiting minor fluctuations in public leaderboard scores
during their model refinement activities (that is, preventing improvements
to the hundreth or thousandth decimal place of the performance metric).
Mechanistically, the Ladder only releases the actual (rounded) score of a
new submission if the score presents a statistically significant improvement
over the previously best submission of the participant. If not, the Ladder
releases the score of the participant’s best submission to that point.
The Ladder mechanism is simple and represents a real improvement over
the so called Full-disclosure mechanism (i.e., simply releasing the public
leaderboard score for every submission made), which cannot protect less
careful participants from over-fitting the public leaderboard response data.
Hardt and Blum illustrate this point, in the context of a classification prob-
lem, showing how a variant of the Ladder (called parameter-free Ladder, and
described in Algorithm 2 in Methods) can withstand an aggressive boosting
attack, to which the Full-disclosure mechanism is completely defenseless. In
this paper, we focus on regression problems and evaluate the Ladder mech-
anism (Algorithm 3 in Methods) under two adversarial attacks. Both are
inspired by Freedman’s paradox[10], where the selection of the features en-
tering a multiple regression model is guided by the public leaderboard. The
first, denoted “Freedman’s attack”, describes an efficient recipe to over-fit
the public leaderboard response data. Our experiments show the effective-
ness of the Ladder algorithm in this context. The second attack, on the other
hand, is based on a more aggressive step-forward variation of Freedman’s
attack (denoted the “step-forward Freedman’s attack”), and can lead to se-
vere over-fitting of the Ladder leaderboard when the sample size is small.
The step-forward attack exploits a vulnerability of the Ladder, namely, that
it leaks too much information regarding the holdout data when it releases
the public leaderboard score of the best model to that point. To circumvent
this problem, we propose an important variation of the Ladder, called the
LadderBoot algorithm, which releases a bootstrapped estimate of the public
leaderboard score, instead of the actual (rounded) score. In our experiments,
the LadderBoot compared favorably to the Ladder. A detailed description
of the LadderBoot mechanism is given in Algorithm 4 in Methods.
An additional contribution of this paper is to extend the scope of the
Ladder and LadderBoot mechanisms to performance metrics other than ones
corresponding to empirical risk estimators, to which the Ladder algorithm is
not directly applicable. Our more general algorithms rely on a more broadly
applicable testing procedure based on the Bayesian bootstrap and we call
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the BayesBootLadder and BayesBootLadderBoot mechanisms (Algorithms
5 and 6 in Methods).
Results. We experimented with variations of the Ladder mechanism
using a subset of the data from the Alzheimer Disease Big Data DREAM
Challenge 1[11], denoted as “AD Challenge”. The goal of this challenge was
to predict mini-mental state examination (MMSE) scores[12] using 2,150
features (morphometric measurements) extracted from MRI data, as well
as, clinical and demographic covariates. Here, we focused on the imaging
features of n = 628 samples from the Alzheimer’s Disease Neuroimaging
Initiative (ADNI) data[13]. Also, for the sake of computational speed, we
restricted most of our analyses to p = 300 randomly chosen imaging features.
For some of the illustrative examples we also relied on a simulated data set
with n = 120 and p = 1, 000. To mirror real word examples, we employed a
small sample size in these simulated examples that clearly show over-fitting
and provide clear-cut illustrations of the issues.
In all experiments we split the data into training, public leaderboard,
and final scoring sets, of roughly equal sample sizes. For each set we scaled
both the features and response data. In order to assess the variability of
the results, the experiments were replicated a large number of times (100 or
1000 times). Experiments were performed in two distinct ways: “permuted
response” experiments, where we kept the training, public leaderboard, and
final/test sets fixed, but permuted the response data on each of these sets;
and “random data splitting” experiments, where the data was randomly
split into training, public leaderboard, and final scoring set.
Note that any signal detected in the “permuted data” experiments is due
purely to random chance, and amounts to over-fitting the model to noise
fluctuations in the holdout set. Hence, the permuted responses experiments
provide the clearest illustrations of over-fitting. Results from the random
data split experiments, on the other hand, are not as clear cut since the
detected signal might be due to real associations, to over-fitting, or (most
likely) to a combination of both. In any case, we investigated (and reported
in the Supplement) the performance of the algorithms in the random data
split experiments, as these experiments reproduce the real conditions under
which these methods are usually applied.
Freedman’s attack. This attack is inspired by “Freedman’s paradox”,
which portrays a problem in model selection where features not related to
the response variable can appear artificially important[10], and describes a
recipe to over-fit the public leaderboard in the context of a regression prob-
lem. The idea is to perform feature selection guided by the scores released
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to the public leaderboard. Explicitly, the attack proceeds as follows. First,
we fit separate univariate regression models of the response on each of the
p features using the training data, then submit all p univariate models to
the public leaderboard. Next, we rank the univariate models according to
the public leaderboard scores, and train a multiple linear regression model
using the top k features (for an arbitrary choice of k). We then evaluate
and compare the performances of this final multiple regression model on the
public leaderboard and final scoring set.
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Fig 1. Public leaderboard MSE scores released by the Full-disclosure mech-
anism (panel a) and the Ladder mechanism based on α = 0.15 (panel b).
Results based on a simulated data set with shuffled response data. The red
dots represent the 30 features with smallest MSE scores. The vertical red
line in panel b shows the index of the feature responsible for the last “jump
in score” in the public scores released by the Ladder mechanism (feature
number 249 in this example).
Fig.1 presents the public leaderboard mean squared error (MSE) released
by the Full-disclosure mechanism (Fig.1a) and the Ladder mechanism (Fig.1b)
for a simulated data set with p = 1000 features, n = 120 samples, and sig-
nificance level associated with the one sided t-test in Algorithm 3 set to
α = 0.15. We permuted the response data so that none of the features
are truly associated with the response. The features were simulated from a
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multivariate normal distribution with strong correlation structure. Since we
scaled the response data, models with an MSE greater than 1 are performing
worse than the intercept only model (where the prediction in the leaderboard
set is given by the mean response value in the training set), whereas models
with MSE smaller than 1 are performing better. From Fig.1a we see that
most of the features generate MSE slightly above 1 (with a few considerably
larger or smaller than 1 due to random chance). The red dots represent the
k = 30 features with smallest MSE scores. Note that while the red dots are
spread across the 1,000 features in Fig.1a, they are all clustered together on
Fig.1b (corresponding to feature 249 and the following 29 features), since
the scores released by the Ladder are identical for all features after index 249
(by convention, we simply select the first k consecutive features, instead of
randomly selecting the top features among all tied features). It is clear from
Fig.1 that the multiple regression model including the top features from
the Full-disclosure public leaderboard includes 30 features with some degree
of association to the permuted response data, whereas the features selected
from the Ladder leaderboard contain only a few features associated with the
permuted responses (including feature 249 and, possibly, a few neighboring
features due to the strong correlation of the simulated features) and won’t
be able to drastically over-fit the public leaderboard.
Fig.2 presents the results of the permuted response experiment compar-
ing the Full-disclosure and Ladder mechanisms (for varying α levels) un-
der Freedman’s attack. The boxplots in the left column panels represent
the distributions of the MSEs released by the public (red) and final (blue)
leaderboards, while right column panels present the boxplots of the ∆MSE,
∆MSE = MSEpublic −MSEfinal ,
generated from 1,000 random permutations of the response data, for k in-
creasing from 1 to 30. A negative ∆MSE indicates over-fitting to the public
leaderboard data. Fig.2a and b show the inability of the Full-disclosure mech-
anism to withstand Freedman’s attack, with MSEs in the public leaderboard
decreasing as a function of k, while the final MSEs actually increase with
k. Fig.2c and d, on the other hand, clearly show the effectiveness of the
Ladder mechanism for avoiding over-fitting (α = 0.01, red boxplots closely
track the blue boxplots). Fig.2e to h, illustrate how the Ladder can still
withstand Freedman’s attack when employed with more relaxed significance
levels. Note that even though we observe an increasing amount of over-fitting
for increasing α levels, the amount is nevertheless small, and the results seem
to be robust to the choice of α. We observe similar, although not as extreme,
results for the random splitting experiments (Fig.S1).
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Fig 2. Comparison of the Full-disclosure vs Ladder mechanisms (based on α
equal to 0.01, 0.15, and 0.5) using the AD Challenge data. Results based on
1,000 response data permutations, and on a subset of 300 randomly chosen
features.
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Step-forward Freedman’s attack. Even though the Ladder mechanism
seems to be effective against Freedman’s attack, it is nonetheless defenseless
against the more aggressive attack we describe next. This second attack as-
sumes that the challenge organizers do not restrict the number of allowed
submissions per participant. It is based on a variation of Freedman’s attack
and exposes a vulnerability of the Ladder mechanism. The problem is that
whenever a model is better (by a given margin) than the best model to this
point, the Ladder mechanism releases the actual (rounded) public leader-
board score of the model. By doing so, it leaks the information that this
particular feature has some predictive power. As illustrated in Fig.1b, an
attacker can easily select a good (although not necessarily the best) univari-
ate feature for predicting the public leaderboard response data, by simply
tracking out the feature responsible for the last “jump” in performance as re-
flected in the leaderboard and released by the Ladder mechanism. Once the
first feature is selected, the attacker can engage in an iterative attack, mim-
icking the step-forward best subset feature selection approach. In a second
iteration the attacker fits p − 1 separate regression models (each including
the feature selected in the first step plus one of the p−1 remaining features)
and then selects a new feature responsible for yet another last jump in score
in Ladder’s public leaderboard. In the third iteration, the attacker fits p− 2
separate regression models (each including the two features selected in the
two previous steps, plus one of the p − 2 remaining features) and so on.
Algorithm 7 in Methods describes the step-forward attack in more detail.
Fig.3 illustrates a step-forward attack (ran for 10 iteration steps) to the
same simulated data-set employed in the generation of Fig.1. After 10 itera-
tions, we obtain a model (containing 10 features) with a MSE around 0.4 in
the Ladder’s public leaderboard, whereas the score on the final scoring set is
expected to be close to 1 (none of the features in this simulated data-set are
truly associated with the response). Contrary to Freedman’s attack, where
the final multiple regression model derived from the Ladder leaderboard
contained the feature responsible for the last jump in addition to a number
of features that were not actually associated with the permuted response,
all 10 features (red vertical lines in Fig.3) selected during the step-forward
attack are associated (by pure chance) to the permuted response data, so
that the respective multiple regression model can strongly over-fit the public
leaderboard holdout data.
In order to further illustrate the amount of over-fitting incurred by the
Ladder mechanism under the step-forward attack, we performed a permuted
responses experiment using the AD challenge data. Fig.4 presents the box-
plots of the ∆MSE for step-forward attacks based on 2, 3, 4, and 5 iteration
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Fig 4. Over-fitting incurred by the Ladder mechanism (based on α equal to
0.01, 0.15, and 0.5) under step-forward attacks with increasing number of
iterations, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 100 permutations
of the response data, and on a subset of 300 randomly chosen features.
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steps under three different α levels (0.01, 0.15, and 0.50). We observe similar
results for the random splitting experiments (Fig.S2).
As expected, we observe an increase in the amount of over-fitting as we
increase the number of iterations of the step-forward algorithm. Further-
more, as clearly shown by the considerable smaller amount of over-fitting
incurred by smaller α values (Fig.4a-c, the results from the step-forward
attack seem to be more sensible to the choice of α than the results from
Freedman’s attack. This increased sensibility is, nonetheless, not surprising
since smaller α values lead to a more conservative mechanism with fewer
but larger jumps, whereas larger α values lead to more liberal mechanisms
with frequent but smaller jumps and can increase the chance of over-fitting
during an iterative attack.
The LadderBoot mechanism. In order to mitigate the information leak-
age incurred by the Ladder mechanism, we add some randomness to the
output of the algorithm, so that the attacker is no longer able to easily
pinpoint features with minor incremental value. To this end, we adopt a
bootstrap based privacy mechanism, where instead of releasing the public
leaderboard score, we release the average over b bootstrap replications of
the loss vectors data. By doing so, the algorithm effectively employs a more
robust measure of performance, less dependent on the strict composition of
the leaderboard test set, and able to obscure the information that can be
used for overfitting. A detailed description of our algorithm, denoted the
LadderBoot mechanism, is provided on Algorithm 4 in Methods.
An important practical question is to determine the amount of random-
ness that would give the attacker a hard time, but at the same time, would
allow the algorithm to release a useful score, capable of guiding challenge
participants on their model building process. Large values of b lead to pre-
cise estimates of the score but can also make it easy to detect features with
some predictive power. Small b values, on the other hand, lead to less precise
estimates, but make it harder to detect informative features. In addition to
the number of bootstraps, the adopted α value controls the average gap be-
tween jumps, since the larger the gap, the greater the amount of randomness
needed to make the step-forward attack difficult.
Fig.5a-d compares the released public leaderboard scores of the Ladder
algorithm against the LadderBoot mechanism, under Freedman’s attack,
using b equal to 1000, 100, and 10. In all four cases, α = 0.15. We see that
the amount of bootstrap noise generated with 1000 (or even 100) bootstrap
replications is not enough to hide the last performance jump position. On the
other hand, adoption of b = 10 makes it difficult to determine the last jump
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location. Fig.5e-h, show the released public leaderboard scores generated by
the step-forward attack ran for 10 iterations. Clearly, the amount of over-
fitting decreases as we decrease the number of bootstrap replications. At each
iteration step, the determination of the last performance gain location was
done automatically using the binary segmentation[14] method implemented
in the changepoint[15] R package[16]. The reduction in over-fitting (i.e., the
plateauing at higher MSEs) shows that the bootstrap noise prevented the
change-point method from detecting the correct position of the jumps, even
though we informed the true number of jumps to the change-point detection
method at each iteration of the step-forward attack.
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Fig 5. Comparison of the public leaderboard scores released by the Ladder
and LadderBoot mechanisms (for b equal to 1,000, 100, and 10, and α = 0.15)
under Freedman’s attack (panels a to d) and under the step-forward attack
ran for 10 iterations (panels e to h). Results based on simulated data.
Fig.6 compares the ∆MSE of the Ladder and LadderBoot mechanisms
for all combinations of α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} and b = {10, 100, 1000} in a per-
muted responses experiment. The results show that the LadderBoot mech-
12 CHAIBUB NETO ET AL.
anism outperforms the Ladder mechanism under the step-forward attack in
all cases investigated. It also shows that for larger values of b, the Ladder-
Boot mechanism can also over-fit the public leaderboard data (especially for
large values of α). We observe similar results for the random splitting ex-
periments (Fig.S3). Fig.S4 and S5 show the public leaderboard MSE scores
for the permuted responses and random data split experiments, respectively.
For completeness, we present a comparison of the Ladder and LadderBoot
mechanisms under Freedman’s attack in Suppl. Text S1.
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Fig 6. Comparison of the ∆MSE values released by the Ladder and
LadderBoot algorithms, for all combinations of α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} and
b = {10, 100, 1000}, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 100
permutations of the response data, and on 300 randomly selected features.
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Extension to additional scoring metrics. The decision to release a new
performance measure in the Ladder and LadderBoot algorithms is implicitly
guided by a one-sided paired t-test of loss vectors (equation 2 in Methods).
The adoption of this implicit test restricts the applicability of the Ladder
and LadderBoot mechanisms to performance metrics corresponding to em-
pirical risk estimators such as mean squared error and mean absolute error,
but cannot be directly applied to commonly used metrics such as Lin’s
concordance correlation coefficient[17] and Pearson’s correlation, since these
metrics cannot be directly expressed as an arithmetic average of element-
wise loss values.
In order to extend the applicability of the Ladder and LadderBoot mecha-
nisms to general scoring metrics, we replace the paired t-test by the Bayesian
bootstrap[19]. We denote these Bayesian bootstrap based variations of the
Ladder and LadderBoot algorithms as the BayesBootLadder and BayesBoot-
LadderBoot mechanisms, respectively. Algorithms 5 and 6 in the Methods,
present in detail these mechanisms. An illustration based on Lin’s concor-
dance correlation coefficient[17] is presented in the Supplementary Text S2.
Discussion. In this paper we show how the Ladder algorithm can leak
too much information about the public leaderboard performances and is vul-
nerable to a step-forward variation of Freedman’s attack when the sample
size is small. We also propose the LadderBoot mechanism and illustrate how
the adoption of a bootstrap privacy mechanism is able to mitigate this vul-
nerability by adding a controlled amount of noise to the public leaderboard.
Bootstrap based privacy mechanisms have been previously used in different
contexts, including in the selection of micro-data records to be disclosed to
the public[21, 22, 23, 24], masking of contingency tables[25], disclosure lim-
itation in regression analysis[26], and response masking in remote analysis
systems[27]. We point out, nonetheless, that the combination of bootstrap-
ping and Ladder into a single mechanism is novel.
We also extended the applicability of the Ladder and LadderBoot mech-
anisms to more general scoring metrics (other than the ones corresponding
to empirical risk estimators) by replacing the one-sided paired t-test em-
ployed in these algorithms by a Bayesian bootstrap based test. It is not only
possible, but actually advisable to use the Bayesian bootstrap test for met-
rics corresponding to empirical risk estimators since the bootstrap approach
does not require any of the distributional assumptions made by the paired
t-test (it only requires independence of the data samples). The price payed
for this more general applicability is, nonetheless, the increased amount of
computation.
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One possible refinement of the algorithms proposed in this paper is to
consider adaptive variations, where the initial submissions of each partici-
pant is perturbed by a small amount of noise that is adaptively increased as
a function of the number of submissions provided by the participant. For ex-
ample, starting with a large b and decreasing b as the number of submissions
increases. Such adaptive algorithms would be able to neutralize potentially
less careful participants while minimally penalizing the model refinement
activities of more parsimonious participants.
It is important to highlight that even though the LadderBoot and Bayes-
BootLadderBoot mechanisms are able to better withstand a step-forward
attack, in comparison to the Ladder, they are still vulnerable to over-fitting
if we do not restrict the number of allowed submissions per participant. For
instance, even if we adopt a LadderBoot (BayesBootLadderBoot) mecha-
nism based on a single bootstrap replication (b = 1), an attacker can still
figure out the last “performance jump” positions if allowed an unlimited
number of submissions to the public leaderboard. All an attacker has to do
is submit each univariate model a large number of times and compute the
average of the LadderBoot (BayesBootLadderBoot) released scores. More
concretely, the attacker could (starting with the first feature): (1) gener-
ate the feature’s univariate model; (2) submit the univariate model to the
public leaderboard a large number of times, T ; (3) compute and record the
average of the released LadderBoot (BayesBootLadderBoot) scores; (4) re-
peat steps 1 to 3 for each one of the remaining features; and (5) plot the
recorded averages against the feature’s indexes. For a large T , the average
scores will likely be very close to the public leaderboard score released by
the Ladder (BayesBootLadder), and the attacker should be able to easily
determine the “last jump” position, and proceed with a respective “average
across repeated submissions” step-forward attack. A simple solution to this
issue would be to check the submissions to see if they are the same and, if
so, reject the submission.
These considerations show that the LadderBoot mechanism, although
more protective than the Ladder, still leaks some information about the
public leaderboard scores (information leakage is really unavoidable if the
released score is to be useful). In any case, the Ladder, LadderBoot and
BayesBootLadderBoot algorithms provide a reliable mechanism for main-
taining an accurate public leaderboard, as long as we impose a restriction
on the number of allowed submissions per participant, or monitor that the
submissions are not identical or tightly correlated. The question then be-
comes: how many submissions can we safely allow, before participants start
over-fitting the public leaderboard? Recent theoretical work by Dwork et
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al[28] answered this exact question, but for a distinct differential privacy
algorithm called Thresholdout. In the original Ladder paper, Hardt and
Blum[9] derive a theoretical worst-case upper bound for the leaderboard
accuracy of a bounded metric in the interval [0, 1], in the context of a classi-
fication problem. Their results are not directly applicable to the regression
problems based on unbounded metrics considered in the present work, or to
the LadderBoot and BayesBootLadderBoot algorithms. Hence, the determi-
nation of the maximum number of submissions to the public leaderboard
remains an open theoretical question in our context.
It might still be possible to get some empirical guidance on this matter, by
experimenting with tuning parameter choices during the dry-run phase of a
challenge, where organizers curate the data, develop and refine the questions
to be possed to the community, and assess the feasibility of the challenge. In
Supplementary Text S3 we describe an heuristic approach for determining a
general ballpark for the number of submissions. It is important, nonetheless,
to indicate that these empirical results can only provide a rough guideline,
as the amount of over-fitting might also depend on the scoring metric and
on the models employed during the over-fitting quantification study. (In
Supplementary Text S4 we illustrate how the amount of variability of the
released scores also depends on the quality of predictions themselves, so
that results might be different depending on whether we employ a simple
multiple linear regression model, or use elastic-net or random forests, when
combining the top features selected during the attacks.)
In any case, we argue that even rough empirical estimates can be valuable
in practice, since we might be able to scale up the number of allowed submis-
sions, even when we are very conservative and adopt a much smaller limit
than our empirical results suggest to be safe. These empirical evaluations are
particularly important for challenges employing small sample sizes, as these
are particularly prone to over-fitting. Finally, it is important to highlight
that these estimates are based on very aggressive and malicious attacks, but
in practice most challenge participants will not behave this way.
In summary, the adoption of the Ladder or its variations will lower the
risk to scale up the number of allowed submissions to the public leader-
board. For instance, instead of allowing only 3 submissions, a challenge or-
ganizer might be able to safely allow, say, 30 or 300 submissions depending
on whether he/she adopts the Ladder or the LadderBoot leaderboard. This
represents an important improvement, as it provides participants the oppor-
tunity, and better conditions, to refine their models and ultimately generate
better solutions to the problem the challenge is aiming to solve. The present
work was motivated by the need to control over-fitting in biomedical re-
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search challenges, where the amount of data is sometimes scant. We point
out, nonetheless, that the proposed methodology is general and applicable
to crowdsourced benchmarking of predictive models in engineering, life sci-
ences, physical sciences and business. We plan to implement these algorithms
in future DREAM challenges.
Methods. Algorithm 1 presents the general Ladder mechanism pro-
posed by Hardt and Blum [9]. Here, D = (X ,y) = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
represents a data set of n independent and identically distributed data
points, (xi, yi), where yi corresponds to the output (response) variable, and
xi = (xi1, . . . , xip)
T represents the vector of input (covariate) variables. The
empirical risk of a prediction yˆ = f(X) is defined as,
(1) R(yˆ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
l(f(xi), yi) ,
where li = l(f(xi), yi) represents the loss associated with the prediction
yˆi of the outcome value yi. We define a parameter η, which represents the
margin (or step size) by which the current prediction needs to outperform
the best prediction so far in order for the Ladder mechanism to release a new
(rounded) score. Explicitly, if the condition on line 6 holds, the algorithm
releases the rounded empirical risk value [R(yˆ)]η , with the rounding precision
controlled by η as well (line 7). For instance, if the empirical risk is given
by R(yt) = 0.8763, then the released scores are given by [0.8763]0.1 = 0.9,
[0.8763]0.01 = 0.88, [0.8763]0.001 = 0.876, for η equal to 0.1, 0.01, and 0.001,
respectively. If the condition on line 6 does not hold, the algorithm releases
the best score so far.
Algorithm 1 General Ladder mechanism (Hardt and Blum, 2015)
1: Input: Data, D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
2: Assign initial estimate R0 ←∞.
3: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
4: Receive prediction yˆt
5: Compute empirical risk R(yˆt)
6: if R(yˆt) < Rt−1 − η then
7: Rt ← [R(yˆt)]η
8: else
9: Rt ← Rt−1
10: Release Rt
As pointed in [9], it is difficult to choose a fixed η value that would
work well throughout the challenge. To circumvent this problem, Hardt
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and Blum[9] proposed the parameter-free Ladder algorithm (Algorithm 2),
which adaptively finds a suitable margin value according to previous sub-
missions to the algorithm by choosing η = sd(lt − lt−1)/
√
n, where sd
represents the standard deviation operator, and lt = (lt,1, . . . , lt,n)
t and
lt−1 = (lt−1,1, . . . , lt−1,n)
t represent, respectively, the loss vectors associated
with the current and so far best predictions. Note that the condition on line
8 of Algorithm 2 can be (approximately) re-expressed in the format of a
paired t-test statistic,
√
n (l¯t − [l¯t−1]1/n)
sd(lt − lt−1) < −1
where l¯t = R(yˆt) = n
−1
∑n
i=1 lt,i and l¯t−1 = R(yˆt−1) = n
−1
∑n
i=1 lt−1,i repre-
sent the empirical risks. Clearly, the condition is (approximately) equivalent
to performing a one-sided paired t-test adopting a p-value close to 0.15. (It
would be exactly equivalent to a paired t-test if we had l¯t−1 in place of
[l¯t−1]1/n.) As pointed out by Hardt and Blum[9], this test employs increas-
ingly smaller margin values as the best prediction (so far) gets increasingly
accurate.
Algorithm 2 Parameter-free Ladder algorithm (Hardt and Blum, 2015)
1: Input: Data, D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
2: Assign initial estimate R0 ←∞
3: Assign initial loss vector l0 = (0)
n
i=1.
4: for t = 1, 2, . . . do
5: Receive prediction yˆt
6: Compute loss vector lt ← (l(yˆt,i , yi))ni=1
7: Compute R(yˆt)← n−1
∑n
i=1
lt,i
8: if R(yˆt) < Rt−1 − sd(lt − lt−1)/
√
n then
9: Rt ← [R(yˆt)]1/n
10: else
11: Rt ← Rt−1
12: lt ← lt−1
13: Release Rt
In this paper, nonetheless, we consider a slight extension of the parameter-
free algorithm, where a challenge organizer can specify the significance level
α for the underlying paired t-test (Algorithm 3). Since this extended al-
gorithm is no longer parameter free, we call it the Ladder algorithm, but
point out that it is still a variant of the general Ladder mechanism (Algo-
rithm 1), and should not be confused with it. The main difference, relative
to the parameter-free Ladder algorithm, is that the condition on line 9 can
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be re-expressed in the format of a one-sided paired t-test statistic,
(2)
√
n (l¯t − [l¯t−1]1/n)
sd(lt − lt−1) < −cα
where cα = F
−1
n−1(α) represents the α quantile of a t-distribution with n− 1
degrees of freedom.
Algorithm 3 Ladder algorithm (based on the paired t-test statistic)
1: Input: Data, D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
2: Significance level α for underlying paired t-test, or corresponding critical value cα =
F−1n−1(α)
3: Assign initial estimate R0 ←∞
4: Assign initial loss vector l0 = (0)
n
i=1.
5: for t = 1, 2, . . . , tmax do
6: Receive prediction yˆt
7: Compute loss vector lt ← (l(yˆt,i , yi))ni=1
8: Compute R(yˆt)← n−1
∑n
i=1
lt,i
9: if R(yˆt) < Rt−1 − cα sd(lt − lt−1)/
√
n then
10: Rt ← [R(yˆt)]1/n
11: else
12: Rt ← Rt−1
13: lt ← lt−1
14: Release Rt
As pointed out in Section 5, the Ladder is vulnerable to the step-forward
Freedman’s attack because it leaks too much information about the hold-
out data when it releases the (rounded) score of the best submission so
far. A strait forward tweak of the Ladder mechanism capable to circum-
vent (to some extent) this issue, is to simply add some randomness to
the output of the Ladder mechanism. To this end, we propose the Lad-
derBoot algorithm (Algorithm 4), which adopts a bootstrap based privacy
mechanism in order to generate the necessary randomness. Contrary to the
Ladder, which releases the rounded score whenever the condition R(yˆt) <
Rt−1 − cα sd(lt − lt−1)/
√
n is met, the LadderBoot releases a bootstrapped
estimate of R(yˆt), computed from b bootstrap replications of the loss vector
lt (as detailed in lines 12 and 13) if the condition is met, and a bootstrapped
estimate of R(yˆt−1), otherwise (lines 15 and 16).
In the Ladder and LadderBoot algorithms, the decision to release a new
score is implicitly guided by a one-sided paired t-test of loss vectors (equa-
tion 2). We point out, nonetheless, that the adoption of this implicit test
restricts the applicability of the Ladder and LadderBoot mechanisms to per-
formance metrics which correspond to empirical risk estimators, as defined
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Algorithm 4 LadderBoot mechanism (based on the paired t-test statistic)
1: Input: Data, D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
2: Significance level α for underlying paired t-test, or corresponding critical value cα =
F−1n−1(α)
3: Number of bootstrap replications b
4: Assign initial estimate R0 ←∞
5: Assign initial loss vector l0 = (0)
n
i=1.
6: for t = 1, 2, . . . , tmax do
7: Receive prediction yˆt
8: Compute loss vector lt ← (l(yˆi , yi))ni=1
9: Compute R(yˆt)← n−1
∑n
i=1
lt,i
10: Compute R(yˆt−1)← n−1
∑n
i=1
lt−1,i
11: if R(yˆt) < R(yˆt−1)− cα sd(lt − lt−1)/
√
n then
12: Generate b bootstrap replications l∗t of lt, and for each compute R
∗
j,t =
n−1
∑n
i=1
l∗t,i
13: R∗t ← b−1
∑b
j=1
R∗j,t
14: else
15: Generate b bootstrap replications l∗t−1 of lt−1, and for each compute R
∗
j,t−1 =
n−1
∑n
i=1
l∗t−1,i
16: R∗t ← b−1
∑b
j=1
R∗j,t−1
17: lt ← lt−1
18: Release R∗t
in equation 1. For instance, the mean squared error metric corresponds to the
average of element-wise quadratic losses, li = (yˆi − yi)2, whereas the mean
absolute error is given by the average of absolute losses, li = |yˆi − yi|. In
the context of classification problems, the classification error is given by the
average of zero-one losses, li = 1 {yˆi 6= yi}. The paired t-test cannot, how-
ever, be directly applied to commonly adopted metrics such as concordance
correlation coefficient and Pearson and Spearman’s correlation coefficients,
which cannot be directly expressed as an average of element-wise loss values.
In order to extend the applicability of the Ladder and LadderBoot mech-
anisms to other performance metrics, we have to replace the paired t-test by
a more general statistical procedure. Here, we adopt a Bayesian perspective,
and employ the Bayesian bootstrap[19] to estimate the posterior distribution
of the the statistic,
∆s = s(yˆt , y)− s(yˆt−1 , y) ,
where s(yˆ , y) represents an arbitrary scoring metric, and perform a one-
sided Bayesian hypothesis test to determine whether the current score is
statistically better than the best score so far. For scoring metrics such as
correlation coefficients, where larger scores indicate better performance, we
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perform the one-sided test,
H0 : ∆s ≤ 0 vs H1 : ∆s > 0 ,
whereas for scoring metrics for which smaller values indicate better perfor-
mance we test,
H0 : ∆s ≥ 0 vs H1 : ∆s < 0 .
The Bayesian test is based on the posterior odds in favor of H1,
PO =
P (H1 | D)
P (H0 | D) =
P (H1 | D)
1− P (H1 | D) ,
where the posterior probability of the alternative hypothesis, P (H1 | D),
is given by the proportion of bootstrap samples (in the Bayesian bootstrap
posterior distribution) for which H1 is true (i.e., for which ∆s > 0, in the
“the larger, the better” case, and for which ∆s < 0, in the “the smaller,
the better” case). We call these Bayesian bootstrap variations of the Lad-
der and LadderBoot algorithms the BayesBootLadder (Algorithm 5) and
BayesBootLadderBoot (Algorithm 6) mechanisms, respectively.
Algorithm 5 BayesBootLadder mechanism (for “the larger, the better”
scoring metrics)
1: Input: Data, D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
2: Number of bootstrap replications, B, for ∆s distribution
3: Number of bootstrap replications, b, for released score
4: Posterior odds threshold POthr
5: Assign initial prediction, yˆ
0
6: Assign initial score, s(yˆ
0
, y).
7: for t = 1, 2, . . . , tmax do
8: Receive prediction yˆt
9: Generate B paired bootstrap replications of the statistic ∆s = s(yˆt , y) −
s(yˆt−1 , y)
10: Compute the posterior odds, PO, for the Bayesian hypothesis test, H0 : ∆s ≤ 0
vs H1 : ∆s > 0.
11: if PO ≥ POthr then
12: st ← [s(yˆt , y)]1/n
13: else
14: st ← [s(yˆt−1 , y)]1/n
15: yˆt ← yˆt−1
16: Release st
Computation of the posterior distribution of the ∆s statistic (line 9 of
Algorithms 5 and 6) with the Bayesian bootstrap is based on weighting the
(yˆt, yˆt−1,y) data according to weights sampled from a Dirichlet distribution.
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Algorithm 6 BayesBootLadderBoot mechanism (for “the larger, the bet-
ter” scoring metrics)
1: Input: Data, D = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}
2: Number of bootstrap replications, B, for ∆s distribution
3: Number of bootstrap replications, b, for released score
4: Posterior odds threshold POthr
5: Assign initial prediction, yˆ
0
6: Assign initial score, s(yˆ
0
, y).
7: for t = 1, 2, . . . , tmax do
8: Receive prediction yˆt
9: Generate B paired bootstrap replications of the statistic ∆s = s(yˆt , y) −
s(yˆt−1 , y)
10: Compute the posterior odds, PO, for the Bayesian hypothesis test, H0 : ∆s ≤ 0
vs H1 : ∆s > 0.
11: if PO ≥ POthr then
12: Generate b bootstrap replications s∗j,t of the statistic st
13: s∗t ← b−1
∑b
j=1
s∗j,t
14: else
15: Generate b bootstrap replications s∗j,t−1 of the statistic st−1
16: s∗t ← b−1
∑b
j=1
s∗j,t−1
17: yˆt ← yˆt−1
18: Release s∗t
For instance, suppose we are interested in using Pearson’s correlation (COR)
as a performance metric. In order to sample one data point from the posterior
distribution of ∆COR = COR(yˆt , y) − COR(yˆt−1 , y), we only need to
sample a weight vector, w = (w1, . . . , wn)
t from a w ∼ Dirichletn(1, . . . , 1)
distribution and compute,
∆COR =
∑
iwi yi yˆt,i − (
∑
iwi yi)(
∑
iwi yˆt,i)√
(
∑
i wi y
2
i − (
∑
i wi yi)
2) (
∑
i wi yˆ
2
t,i − (
∑
iwi yˆt,i)
2)
−
∑
iwi yi yˆt−1,i − (
∑
iwi yi)(
∑
iwi yˆt−1,i)√
(
∑
i wi y
2
i − (
∑
i wi yi)
2) (
∑
iwi yˆ
2
t−1,i − (
∑
iwi yˆt−1,i)
2)
.
(Observe that in order to generate paired bootstrap replications, we use the
same w vector to weight the (yˆt,y) and (yˆt−1,y) data.)
One practical constraint of the Bayesian bootstrap is that it is only readily
applicable to scoring metrics which can be expressed as functions of sam-
ple moments (since the generation of the posterior distribution is based on
weighting the observed data, according to Dirichlet weights as illustrated
above). Although several commonly used performance metrics satisfy this
constraint (e.g, mean squared error, mean absolute error, correlation co-
efficients, concordance correlation coefficient, classification error, and etc),
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there are useful metrics such as the probabilistic concordance index[6] which
cannot be expressed as a function of sample moments.
We point out, however, that for scoring metrics not amenable to the ap-
plication of the Bayesian bootstrap, we can still generate a bootstrap distri-
bution for the ∆s statistic, using the standard non-parametric (frequentist)
bootstrap using data re-sampling, and interpret it as a Bayesian posterior
distribution. (It is known that the sampling distribution generated by the
non-parametric bootstrap closely approximates the posterior distribution of
the quantity of interest generated by the Bayesian bootstrap [19]. As pointed
out in Section 8.4 of [20], inferences derived from the non-parametric boot-
strap can be interpreted as a “poor man’s” automatic Bayesian analysis
based on a non-informative prior.)
Finally, Algorithm 7 presents in detail the step-forward Freedman’s attack
used to illustrate the vulnerability of the Ladder mechanism.
Algorithm 7 Step-forward Freedman’s attack
1: Create a set of selected features, Selected, and assign Selected ← ∅.
2: Create a set of remaining features, Remain, and assign all features to Remain.
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . , imax do
4: For each one of the features in the remain set, xrem, fit a separate regression model
of the response on xrem and on the features in the Selected set, and submit the models
to the public leaderboard.
5: Fit separate univariate regression models of the response on each of the features
in Remain, and submit the models to the public leaderboard.
6: Determine the feature, xsel, responsible for the last jump in public leaderboard
scores released by the Ladder mechanism.
7: Update the set of selected features, Selected ← Selected ∪ xsel.
8: Update the set of remaining features, Remain ← Remain \ xsel.
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Figure S 1. Comparison of the Full-disclosure vs Ladder mechanisms (based
on α equal to 0.01, 0.15, and 0.5) using the AD Challenge data. Results
based on 1,000 random data splits, and on a subset of 300 randomly chosen
features. The Ladder mechanism seems to provide a reduction in over-fitting
but, interestingly, it tended to work slightly better with α = 0.15 (panels e
and f), whereas in the permuted responses experiment α = 0.01 was best
(Fig.2c and d in the main text).
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Figure S 2. Over-fitting incurred by the Ladder (based on α equal to 0.01,
0.15, and 0.5) mechanism under step-forward attacks with increasing number
of iterations, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 100 random
data splits, and on a subset of 300 randomly chosen features.
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Figure S 3. Comparison of the ∆MSE values released by the Ladder and
LadderBoot algorithms, for all combinations of α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} and
b = {10, 100, 1000}, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 100
random data splits, and on 300 randomly selected features.
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Figure S 4. Comparison of the MSE scores released by the Ladder and
LadderBoot algorithms, for all combinations of α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} and
b = {10, 100, 1000}, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 100
permutations of the response data, and on 300 randomly selected features.
Note that MSE values close to 1 indicate a small amount of over-fitting.
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Figure S 5. Comparison of the MSE scores released by the Ladder and
LadderBoot algorithms, for all combinations of α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} and
b = {10, 100, 1000}, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 100
random data splits, and on 300 randomly selected features. In all cases,
we observe larger MSE scores for the LadderBoot mechanism. Also, the
LadderBoot scores tended to show larger variability than the Ladder for
larger values of b (note the larger spread of the dark green boxplots as
b increases from 10 to 1000). While the larger MSE scores suggest that, in
general, the bootstrapped values released by the LadderBoot make it harder
to rank and select the features showing the strongest associations to the
response, the larger spreads suggest that the amount of “bootstrap noise”
was not enough in some replications of the experiments which adopted larger
b values.
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Supplementary Text S1: Comparison of the Ladder vs Lad-
derBoot mechanisms under Freedman’s attack. In the main text
we illustrated how the LadderBoot mechanism leads to more robust pub-
lic leaderboards under the step-forward attack in comparison to the Lad-
der mechanism. Here, we evaluate its performance under the less aggres-
sive Freedman’s attack. Figures S6 and S7 report, respectively, the public
and private leaderboard scores for permuted responses and random data
split experiments using the AD challenge data, for all combinations of the
α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} and b = {10, 100, 1000} parameters.
Overall, Figure S6 reports comparable performances of both mechanisms
on most cases, but with the LadderBoot mechanism slightly outperforming
the Ladder algorithm for α = 0.15 (compare panel b against panels e, h,
and k) and α = 0.5 (compare panel c against panels f, i, and l).
Figure S7 shows some interesting patterns. First, both Ladder and Lad-
derBoot mechanisms seemed to perform well in general (i.e., the the red
and blue boxplots tend to be close in all settings). Second, while the Ladder
mechanism tended to work best with α = 0.15 (compare panel b against
panels a and c), the LadderBoot performed uniformly well across all α lev-
els (as measured by the closeness of the red and blue boxplots). Third, the
MSE scores of the models built according to the LadderBoot released scores
tended to be larger (and more variable, for larger k) than the MSE scores
of the models built from the Ladder output.
This third observation is likely a consequence of the fact that the boot-
strapped values released by the LadderBoot make it harder to rank the
univariate features showing the strongest associations to the response. Of
course, this does not mean that the LadderBoot prevents a participant from
finding a good model (i.e., with low MSE score), it only shows that it is
hard to do so by guiding the model refinement activities on the scores re-
leased by the public leaderboard (illustrating the increased effectiveness of
the LadderBoot mechanism against the Freedman’s attack). Clearly, if a par-
ticipant adopts best practices for avoiding over-fitting to the training (and
to the public leaderboard) and generates a sensible predictive model with
good generalization performance, the MSE score released by the Ladder-
Boot algorithm will be low. Furthermore, as we illustrate in Supplementary
Text S4, the score will likely be close to the public leaderboard score since
the higher the predictive performance of a submission, the smaller is the
variability of the LadderBoot released scores.
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Figure S 6. Comparison of the Ladder and LadderBoot mechanisms under
Freedman’s attack, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 1,000
permutations of the response data, and on 300 randomly selected features.
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Figure S 7. Comparison of the Ladder and LadderBoot mechanisms under
Freedman’s attack, using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 1,000
random data splits, and on 300 randomly selected features.
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Supplementary Text S2: BayesBootLadder and BayesBootLad-
derBoot algorithms: an illustrative example. We illustrate the appli-
cation of the BayesBootLadder and BayesBootLadderBoot algorithms to the
AD challenge data, using Lin’s concordance correlation coefficient. We com-
pare the performances of the Full-disclosure, BayesBootLadder, and Bayes-
BootLadderBoot under Freedman’s attack. For consistency with the α values
employed in the previous experiments we adopt posterior odds thresholds
of {99, 5.67, 1}, corresponding to (1 − α)/α for α = {0.01, 0.15, 0.5} (the
connection between p-values and posterior odds follows from the fact that
the posterior probability of the null hypothesis in the one sided hypothesis
test based on the Bayesian bootstrap closely approximates the p-value from
a one-sided test based on the frequentist bootstrap[18]). As before, we per-
form both permuted responses and random data split experiments. However,
because the Bayesian bootstrap approaches require an increased amount of
computation we performed only 100 replications of each experiment.
Figure S8 presents the results from the permuted responses (panels a
and c) and random data splits (panels b and d) experiments for the Full-
disclosure mechanism. Similarly to our previous results, we observe strong
over-fitting in the permuted responses case, while only a moderate amount
for the random data splits experiment.
Figures S9 and S10 report the results for the BayesBootLadder and Bayes-
BootLadderBoot mechanisms for the permuted responses and random data
split experiments, respectively. The public leaderboard scores released by
the BayesBootLadder and BayesBootLadderBoot algorithms seem to track
well with the private leaderboard scores, except, maybe, for panels c, j, and k
in Figure S9. We point out, however, that this observation and the generally
noisier appearance of the boxplots on Figures S9 and S10, when compared
to Figures S6 and S7, is likely due to the fact that the results were based on
only 100 replications instead of the 1,000 replications used in generation of
Figures S6 and S7.
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Figure S 8. Full-disclosure mechanism results, based on Lin’s concordance
correlation coefficient, for the permuted responses and random data split
experiments under Freedman’s attack. Results based on 100 replications,
and on 300 randomly selected features.
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Figure S 9. Comparison of the BayesBootLadder and BayesBootLadder-
Boot mechanisms, based on Lin’s concordance correlation coefficient, under
Freedman’s attack. Results based on 100 permutations of the response data,
and on 300 randomly selected features.
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Figure S 10. Comparison of the BayesBootLadder and BayesBootLadder-
Boot mechanisms, based on Lin’s concordance correlation coefficient, under
Freedman’s attack. Results based on 100 random data splits, and on 300
randomly selected features.
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Supplementary Text S3: Empirical determination of the num-
ber of submissions. The key question, underlying the practical useful-
ness of the Ladder and LadderBoot mechanisms, is the determination of
the maximum number of submissions a challenge organizer can safely allow,
before participants might start over-fitting their models to the holdout data
supporting the public leaderboard. Here, we present an empirical approach
which can provide some guidance on the matter. We emphasize, however,
that the coarse results generated by the heuristic approach we describe next
can only provide a ballpark for the number of submissions and should be
interpreted as a general guideline and not as a final answer (especially be-
cause the results are model dependent as illustrated in Supplementary Text
S4).
Before we describe our heuristic it is important to first consider what
conditions can lead to the largest amount of over-fitting generated by the
step-forward attack. Clearly, the larger the number of available features,
the easier it is to over-fit. However, given a fixed maximum number of sub-
missions, the following natural question arises: is it better to run the step-
forward attack for a small number of iterations over a larger subset of the
features, or is it better to run it for a larger number of iterations over a
smaller number of features? For concreteness, suppose we have a large num-
ber of features, p, but we are only allowed 120 submissions to the public
leaderboard. We have a few options on how to run a step-forward attack
including: (i) 1 iteration over 120 randomly chosen features; (ii) 3 iterations
over 41 features, since 41+40+39 = 120; (iii) 5 iterations over 26 features,
since 26 + 25 + 24 + 23 + 22 = 120; and (iv) 15 iterations over 15 features,
since 15 + 14 + 13 + . . . + 1 = 120. Note that case i corresponds, actually,
to a simple Freedman’s attack. Case ii selects 3 features with non-negligible
predictive ability out of a subset of 41 randomly chosen features, while case
iii selects 5 features out of 26 randomly chosen features. Case iv, on the
other hand, amounts to selecting all 15 randomly chosen features.
In the context of a “permuted responses” experiment, we would not expect
to see a lot of over-fitting in case i, since our results suggest that the Ladder
is able to withstand well the simple Freedman’s attach. The same is true for
case iv, as the selection of all 15 randomly chosen features would probably
lead to a model unable to predict well the shuffled response data. Cases ii and
iii, on the other hand, have a better chance to over-fit the public leaderboard
since they employ a small number of features with non-negligible ability to
predict the shuffled responses. These considerations suggest that for a given
fixed number of submissions, there is an optimal combination of the number
of iterations and number of features that lead to a maximum amount of
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over-fitting by a step-forward attack. Therefore, in principle, a challenge
organizer might be able to empirically determine the number of iterations
needed to achieve the maximum amount of over-fitting for any fixed number
of submissions.
Here, nonetheless, we employ a simplified strategy (due to computational
constraints). Namely, we estimate the maximum number of submissions a
challenge organizer can safely allow, by quantifying the amount of over-
fitting generated by a step-forward attack examined across a grid of feature
subsets of increasing size, and adopting an adaptive number of iterations
corresponding to 2% of the size of the feature subsets. The rationale for this
choice goes as follows. Ideally, the number of iterations should be equal to
the number of features associated to the permuted responses (since the most
efficient attack, measured by the strongest amount of over-fitting, would
be achieved by incorporating all features associated with the permuted re-
sponses in the multiple regression model). However, for any random sample
of features, we would expect only a small number of features to be associated
by chance to the permuted response data. Therefore, it seems reasonable to
select the number of iterations of the step-forward attack to be proportional
to a small fraction of the number of features in the random sample. Here, we
arbitrary adopt the fraction to be 2%, but recognize that the results might
be affected by a different choice.
Figure S11 reports the results of an experiment where we run the step-
forward attack over 6 distinct settings, namely: 1 iteration over 50 features
(50 submissions), 2 iterations over 100 features (199 submissions), 3 iter-
ations over 150 features (447 submissions), 4 iterations over 200 features
(794 submissions), 5 iterations over 250 features (1240 submissions), and 6
iterations over 300 features (1785 submissions). (Note that the number of
iterations, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, correspond to 2% of the number of features,
50, 100, 150, 200, 250, and 300). The boxplots represent the distributions
of the ∆MSE score over 1,000 replications of each experiment (each repli-
cation used a distinct subset of features, randomly selected from the 2,150
available imaging features). Panels a, b, and c show the results based on α
equal to 0.01, 0.15, and 0.5, respectively. In all cases we adopted b = 100 for
the LadderBoot.
Given a fixed threshold for the amount of over-fitting that a challenge
organizer is prepared to accept, it is then possible to empirically determine
the maximum number of submissions that would lead to less over-fitting than
the threshold. For instance, if we adopt a threshold equal to -0.05 (blue lines
in Figure S11), we would need to restrict the number of submissions to less
than 794 and 447, when adopting the Ladder mechanism with α equal to 0.15
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Figure S 11. Empirical determination of the number of submissions to the
public leaderboard using the AD Challenge data. Results based on 1,000
permutations of the response data for each experimental setting.
and 0.5, respectively, while it would still be fine to allow 1,785 submissions
when using the Ladder with α = 0.01 or the LadderBoot irrespective of the
adopted α value. (Note that we are employing the median of the boxplot in
our comparisons to the adopted threshold.)
Figure S11 clearly shows that the LadderBoot mechanism allows for a
larger number of submissions in all settings tested, but it also suggests that
adoption of α = 0.01 can allow a large number of submissions even when
adopting the Ladder leaderboard. It is important to highlight, however, that
choosing a very stringent α level might discourage participants to engage in
the challenge, as participants might be more inclined to give up if they feel
their attempts to improve their models are usually unsuccessful.
We point out that it is important to perform this analysis using permuted
responses, since the assumption that only a small number of features is asso-
ciated with the response is not necessarily true when the connection between
the response and the features is kept intact. In other words, it is harder to
select a reasonable number of iterations when we run the analysis using un-
shuffled response data, since we cannot easily guess the approximate number
of features associated with the response due entirely to random chance.
The results presented in Figure S11 clearly show that our rough estimates
are sensible to the choice of the α tuning parameter employed by the Lad-
der and LadderBoot algorithms. So, in practice, it is left to the challenge
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organizers to determine a combination of b and α (or posterior odds, when
using the BayesBootLadderBoot algorithm) which would allow a reasonable
number of submissions to the public leaderboard and, at the same time,
would strike a good balance between protection against over-fitting and the
usefulness of the released scores. In any case, we argue that even rough em-
pirical estimates can be valuable in practice, since we might be able to scale
up the number of allowed submissions, even when we are very conservative
and adopt a much smaller limit than our empirical results suggest to be safe.
For instance, even though the results in Figure S11b suggest it is probably
safe to allow 1,800 submissions when we adopt the LadderBoot mechanism
(based on α = 0.15 and b = 100 for the AD Challenge data), the adoption
of a conservative limit of 300 submissions still provides a (two orders of
magnitude) increase over the usual 3 submissions, so often adopted in the
DREAM challenges.
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Supplementary Text S4: On the variability of the LadderBoot
released scores. Here, we show that the variability of the scores released
by the LadderBoot mechanism is affected not only by the number of boot-
straps, but also by the quality of the prediction. Higher quality predictions
lead to a smaller amount of variability in the released scores when compared
to lower quality predictions. To illustrate this point we show in Figure S12
the distributions of the released scores adopting b equal to 10, 100, and 1000,
for a prediction generated by a lasso model (panels a to c), in comparison to
the released scores from a prediction generated with a k-nearest neighbors
(knn) regression model adopting k = 3 (panels d to f). The red vertical lines
correspond to the MSE score of the actual predictions (0.79 for the lasso and
1.12 for the knn). Note the consistently smaller spread of the distributions
in the top panels, based on the higher quality prediction generated by the
lasso, relative to the distributions generated from the knn prediction shown
in the respective bottom panels.
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Figure S 12. Distributions of the LadderBoot released scores for a lasso
and knn regression predictions. Results based on simulated data.
To further illustrate this point we show in Figure S13a boxplots of the
distributions of the LadderBoot scores generated from eight increasing bet-
ter quality predictions (with MSE scores varying from 1.64 to 0.15, and
corresponding Pearson correlations varying from 0.18 to 0.92) for b equal
to 10, 100, and 1000. (In this example, the predictions were generated in
an artificial fashion by simply adding decreasing amounts of gaussian noise
to the true label data.) Figure S13b reports the standard deviations of the
distributions. The results show a clear monotonic decrease in the variabil-
ity of the LadderBoot released scores as a function of increasingly better
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predictions.
In both Figures S12 and S13, the distributions were generated from 10,000
replications of the following process: (i) bootstrap the prediction (and the
corresponding true label) data b times; (ii) compute the MSE score on each
of the b bootstrapped data sets; and (iii) compute the average MSE across
the b bootstrap scores.
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Figure S 13. Monotonic decrease in the variability of the LadderBoot
released scores as a function of increasingly better predictions. The x-axis
show the MSE scores (and respective Pearson correlation in parenthesis) for
eight predictions of increasingly better quality.
